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Developments
Regulation of Informed Consent to Human
Experimentation
I.

INTRODUCTION

Experimentation with human subjects is necessary for the advancement of medical knowledge.' Although medical research
may begin in the laboratory and knowledge may be gained through
experimentation with animals, all new therapies and drugs intended for human use eventually must be tested on man.2 Today,
biomedical researchers are about to begin gene therapy experiments on humans 3 in an attempt to treat and cure inherited diseases 4 which cause one-half of all miscarriages, one-fifth of all
infant deaths, and up to eighty percent of all mental retardation.5
This need to perform medical experiments on humans must be balanced against the need for protection of the individual who is to
serve as the subject. In order to safeguard the individual's right to
determine what is to be done with his6 body, informed consent
must be obtained prior to the initiation of any experimental
procedure.7
Federal regulations address experimentation with human sub1. Fortner v. Koch, 272 Mich. 273, 282, 261 N.W. 762, 765 (1935); CAL. HEALTH&
§ 24171 (West 1984) (medical experimentation on human subjects is vital
for the benefit of mankind).
2. B. BARBER, INFORMED CONSENT IN MEDICAL THERAPY AND RESEARCH 1
(1980).
3. Chi. Tribune, Mar. 2, 1986, at 1, col. 3.
4. Id. at col. 6. Such inherited diseases include cystic fibrosis, muscular dystrophy,
hemophilia, sickle cell anemia, beta thalassemia, Tay-Sachs disease, phenylketonuria,
Huntington's chorea and neurofibramatosis (Elephant Man's disease). Id.
5. Id. at 18, col. 1.
6. In this article, all masculine pronouns should be read as including the female
gender.
7. See G. ANNAS, L. GLANTZ, & B. KATZ, INFORMED CONSENT TO HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION: THE SUBJECT'S DILEMMA (1977) [hereinafter cited as INFORMED
SAFETY CODE

CONSENT].

[It is] the obligation of a physician to disclose and explain to the patient in
language as simple as necessary the nature of the ailment, the nature of the
proposed treatment, the probability of success or of alternatives, and perhaps
the risks of unfortunate results and unforeseen conditions within the body ....
Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 410, 350 P.2d 1093, 1095 (1960).
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jects. s However, these regulations apply only where a research
program is federally funded or conducted by a federal department.9
Where research programs. are without federal funding, the federal
government's authority to regulate human experimentation ends
and the state's authority begins. '0 Only a few states, however, have
statutes which comprehensively address informed consent to
human experimentation.II Instead, some states include informed
consent to human research requirements in patients' rights statutes, 12 or laws protecting particular groups of subjects such as the
mentally ill,1 3 or professional ethics statutes which mandate obtaining a patient's consent to experimentation.' 4 In contrast to federal regulations, which explicitly define what disclosure is
necessary to obtain informed consent,' 5 state statutory provisions
often require only a simple statement that individuals have the
right to refuse to participate in experimental research.' 6 When a
project is conducted without federal funds, in a jurisdiction with no
statutory provision for human experimentation, regulatory oversight is nil.
This article examines the doctrine of informed consent and its
relationship to experimentation with human subjects. Next it
surveys both federal and state statutory regulation of informed
8. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-46.409 (1985); 21 C.F.R. §§ 50.1-56.122 (1985); see 39A
C.J.S. Health & Environment § 4 (1976) (the federal government has a fundamental obligation to promote and improve the health of the people).
9. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (1985); see C. LEVY, THE HUMAN BODY AND THE LAW:
LEGAL & ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 12 (1983). Regulations concerning human experimentation are promulgated by the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS).
Additionally, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is authorized to approve
"new drug" experimentation with human subjects that involves interstate commerce. 21
U.S.C. § 355(a) (1982). A "new drug" is defined as an article intended to cure, mitigate,
treat or prevent disease. 21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (1982). Recombinant DNA gene therapy
would thus fall under the purview of FDA regulations because the "good segment of
DNA" that is inserted into the "bad cells" is an article intended to cure or treat a disease.
McGarity & Shapiro, Public Regulation of Recombinant DNA Gene Therapy, 3 J. LEGAL
MED. 185, 194-203 (1982).
10. The FDA and HHS regulations may sometimes overlap state statutes; both sets
of regulations explicitly state that they are not intended to preempt applicable state or
local laws. 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(c) (1985); 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(e) (1985).
11. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 24170-24179.5 (West 1984); N.Y. PuB.
HEALTH LAW §§ 2440-2446 (McKinney 1985); VA. CODE §§ 37.1-234 to 37.1-241
(1984).
12. See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
13. See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
15. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (1985); see infra notes 73-90 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.720(3) (1985).
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consent to human experimentation and analyzes the different judicial standards which have been applied to determine the scope of
disclosure. Finally, this article recommends that states adopt legislation which comprehensively addresses informed consent to
human experimentation, and advocates the use of a standard of
disclosure that recognizes the autonomy of the individual.
II.

A.

BACKGROUND

Some History of Human Experimentation

Medical experimentation using humans as subjects is as old as
the science of medicine itself.17 However, until the post World War
II Nuremberg trials of Nazi physicians accused of conducting unethical research, there was no widespread public awareness of legal
problems posed by medical research with human subjects.' 8 The
Nuremberg Code, articulated in the court opinion that resulted
from those trials, was subsequently adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly.' 9 The code placed primary importance on the
concept of individual consent.20
17. Hippocrates, while treating a boy whose cortex was exposed, "gently scratched
the surface of the cortex with his fingernail" and observed the resulting convulsions on
the opposite side of the boy's body. Katz, The Education of the Physician-Investigator,98
DAEDALUS 480, 481 (1969).
18. See R. GALLAGHER, NUREMBERG: THE THIRD REICH ON TRIAL 159-205
(1961); A. MITSCHERLICH & F. MIELKE, DOCTORS OF INFAMY: THE STORY OF THE

NAZI MEDICAL CRIMES (1949). The Nuremberg trials were conducted by the International Military Tribunal established by an agreement among the United States, Great
Britain, Russia, and France. INFORMED CONSENT, supra note 7, at 7.
19. The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Nuremberg Code on Dec. 11,
1946. The Code was also used as the basis for the Declaration of Helsinki, thus leading to
the conclusion that the court opinion can properly be characterized as customary international law. INFORMED CONSENT, supra note 7, at 8.
20.

TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS,

2 THE MEDICAL CASE 181 (1949).
The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.
This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give consent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice, without
the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching, or
other ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the subject matter involved as to
enable him to make an understanding and enlightened decision. This latter
element requires that before the acceptance of an affirmative decision by the
experimental subject there should be made known to him the nature, duration
and purpose of the experiment; the method and means by which it is to be
conducted; all inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected; and the
effects upon his health or person which may possibly come from his participation in the experiment.
The duty and responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the consent rests
upon each individual who initiates, directs, or engages in the experiment. It is a
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In the United States during the 1960's, well publicized reports of
research projects involving abuses of the rights of human subjects
generated great concern.21 One of the most infamous examples of
disregard for human subjects was the Tuskegee syphilis experiment, conducted from 1932 to 1972 by the United States Public
Health Service. 22 In Macon County, Alabama, 400 black men suffering from syphilis were deliberately deprived of treatment in order to enable researchers to study the effects of allowing the disease
to take its natural course.23 Even though penicillin, discovered in
1929, had been found to be an effective treatment for syphilis, the
drug was purposely withheld and at least 28 and perhaps as many
as 107 men died as a direct result of the disease.24
Another notorious case of human experimentation was the Willowbrook study in which live hepatitis virus was injected into institutionalized retarded children in an effort to develop a vaccine.25
The researchers justified their study by noting that hepatitis was
rampant throughout the institution and that a new resident would
probably contract the disease shortly after admission. 26 Despite extensive publicity in medical literature,27 the study continued until
the early 1970's, even after a treatment for hepatitis was
discovered.28
personal duty and responsibility which may not be delegated to another with
impunity.
Id.
21. Robertson, The Law of InstitutionalReview Boards, 26 UCLA L. REV. 484, 48687 (1979).
22. Barber, The Ethics of Experimentation with Human Subjects, 234 Sci. AM. 25, 26
(1976).
23. Rothman, Were Tuskegee & Willowbrook "Studies in Nature"?, 12 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 5 (1982).
24. Barber, supra note 22, at 26; N.Y. Times, July 26, 1972, § 1, at 1, col. 1; Id., Sept.
12, 1972, § 1, at 23, col. 1.
25. Ratnoff, Who Shall Decide When Doctors Disagree? A Review of the Legal Development of Informed Consent and the Implications of Proposed Lay Review of Human
Experimentation, 25 CASE. W. RES. L. REv. 472, 489 (1975).
26. Rothman, supra note 23, at 6.
27. Krugman & Giles, Viral Hepatitis, Type B (MS-2 Strain), 288 J. A.M.A. 755
(1973); Krugman, Giles & Hammond, Viral Hepatitis, Type B (MS-2 Strain), 218 J.
A.M.A. 1665 (1971); Krugman, Ward, Giles & Jacobs, Infectious Hepatitis: Studies on
the Effect of Gamma Globulin in the Incidence of InapparentInfection, 174 J. A.M.A. 823
(1960).
28. J. KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS 1007 (1972). Parental consent was obtained; there is controversy, however, as to whether the institution coerced the
parents into giving their consent. Although Willowbrook was closed to all new admissions due to overcrowding, the hepatitis project, which occupied its own space in the
institution, continued to solicit patients. Parents later alleged that they consented out of
fear that their children would be denied admission. See Ratnoff, supra note 25, at 490.
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In the Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital experiment, 29 researchers injected twenty-two elderly debilitated patients with live cancer
cells without obtaining their voluntary informed consents.30 The
Attorney General of New York brought an action before the state's
Board of Regent's Discipline Committee, 31 which found the principal investigators guilty of fraud, deceit, and unprofessional conduct.32 The doctors were punished not for performing experiments
that resulted in harm to the patients,33 but for failing to obtain
informed consent before proceeding.34
These notorious cases of human experimentation resulted in
growing public indignation and increasing advocacy of government
regulation of research involving human subjects. 35 The Nuremberg Code, which requires that the informed consent of the experimental subject be competent, voluntary, and understanding,36
formed the basic structure for federal regulation of experimentation with human subjects.37
B.

The Doctrine of Informed Consent

Informed consent means the "knowing" consent of a person or
his legally authorized representative. 38 An individual cannot consent to participate as an experimental subject unless he first understands for what he is volunteering.39 Informed consent has been
found not to exist where the individual did not understand the
29.

INFORMED CONSENT,

supra note 7, at 20.

30. Mulford, Experimentation on Human Beings, 20 STAN. L. REV. 99, 99 (1967).
31. INFORMED CONSENT, supra note 7, at 20.
32. Mulford, supra note 30, at 100.
33. Id. (the patients suffered no actual harm).
34. Id. at 102. The physicians' medical licenses were initially suspended for one year,
but the suspensions were later stayed and the physicians were instead placed on probation
for one year. Id. at 100. The Board of Regent's Discipline Committee emphasized that
this case involved an experimenter/subject relationship in which the exercise of professional judgment may sometimes provide a basis for withholding the disclosure of certain
risks (therapeutic privilege). The committee stated further that in an experimenter/subject situation, a subject cannot be said to have volunteered for an experimental procedure
unless he first understood for what he was volunteering. INFORMED CONSENT, supra
note 7, at 21. All information that is material to a prospective subject's decision concerning participation in experimental research must therefore be disclosed to the subject. Id.
at 22.
35. Note, Tort Liability of Institutional Review Boards, 87 W.VA. L. REV. 137, 137
(1984).
36.
37.

R. GREENWALD

38.
39.

Id. at 81.
Id.

INFORMED

CONSENT,

supra note 7, at 7; see supra note 20.

& M.

RYAN, HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH:
FOR INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS 21(1982).

A HANDBOOK
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words' or the language41 used. Therefore, where language, educational or cultural differences exist between the researcher and the
subject, the researcher should exercise precautions to ensure that
the subject understands the proposed procedure. A subject's signature on a consent form does not necessarily constitute informed
consent.42
Informed consent consists of a dialogue between the prospective
experimental subject, or his representative, and the researcher.43
The prospective subject gives the researcher information about
himself which may be crucial to the experiment, and the researcher
informs the prospective subject of basic details concerning the
treatment so that the subject may decide whether or not to participate." This exchange of information serves as a check against unnecessary or inappropriate procedures from the perspectives of
both the subject and the researcher.4 5 The subject is better able to
46
discern whether the proposed procedure is in his best interests
and the researcher, by providing substantiated information about
known and unknown risks of the experiment, may benefit by
reevaluating his own notions of the procedure's efficacy.4" Additionally, a well informed patient knows more about his own condition and may feel freer to communicate such information.4"
The doctrine of informed consent was developed to protect the
right of every individual to participate in decisions about his own
medical care. 49 To deprive an individual of the power to accept or
40. Corn v. French, 71 Nev. 280, 289 P.2d 173 (1955). Although the plaintiff was
informed that a mastectomy would be performed and gave her consent, the court found
informed consent not to exist since the plaintiff had not understood the word "mastectomy" when she signed the consent form. Id. at 284-85, 289 P.2d at 175-76.
41. Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974).
The court held that because of the plaintiff's seventh grade education and the language
barrier (plaintiff's primary language was Spanish), she may have lacked the "linquistic
ability" to understand the significance of the consent form that she signed. Id. at 1270.
42. R. GREENWALD & M. RYAN, supra note 37, at 81. Communication problems
can be obviated by explaining procedures in lay terms and by using interpreters or translators where necessary. R. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH
90 (1981).
43. F. RozoVSKY, CONSENT TO TREATMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 3 (1984).
44. Id.
45. Andrews, Informed ConsentStatutes and the DecisionmakingProcess, 5 J. LEGAL
MED. 163, 170 (1984).
46. F. ROzOVSKY, supra note 43, at 3.
47. Andrews, supra note 45, at 170.
48.

J. KATZ & A. CAPRON, CATASTROPHIC DISEASES: WHO DECIDES WHAT?., at

89, 90 (1975); see also Schneyer, Informed Consent and the Danger of Bias in the Formation of Medical Disclosure Practice, 1976 WIs. L. REV. 124 (discussing patients' desires
for treatment information).
49. Curran, Foreword to F. ROZOVSKY, supra note 43, at xxxi.
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refuse medical treatment that may affect his physical or psychological well being is to treat that individual as an object and not as a
person. 50 The concepts of autonomy and individuality are longstanding central values in Anglo-American society and law. 5 ' In
addition, there is evidence that a patient benefits both physically
and psychologically by receiving information about a proposed
treatment. 2 Although the medical profession traditionally has not
recognized patient autonomy, even physicians are beginning to ac5 3
quiese to patient demands for control and information.
The adequacy of consent to a pure experiment or to experimental treatment raises more issues than consent to an established
therapy simply because less is known about the risks involved in an
experimental procedure. 4 Although there exists no absolute guarantee that even an established treatment will be effective and will
not cause harm, the risks are significantly increased when the proposed therapy is experimental. 5 Therefore, a prospective subject
must be made aware that little is known about the possible risks
and consequences of participation in any aspect of human
56
experimentation.

C. Institutional Review Boards
In the area of human experimentation, the researcher's goal of
acquiring new information and the subject's rights may inherently
conflict.5" The researcher or physician may be more interested in
advancing medical knowledge than in protecting the well being of
the human subject.58 Furthermore, the establishment of a researcher's professional identity and career advancement may de50.
51.

Id.
Schultz, From Informed Consent to PatientChoice.- A New ProtectedInterest, 95
YALE L.J. 219, 220 (1985).
52. See Andrews, supra note 45, at 165. In studies conducted with elective surgery
patients, the disclosure of information concerning the nature of the procedure and the
predicted postsurgery sensations enhanced the patients' ability to adjust to postoperative
stress and decreased the amount of pain medication and the number of hospital recovery
days. Id. (discussing I.L. JANIS, PSYCHOLOGICAL STRESS: PSYCHOANALYTIC AND BEHAVIORAL STUDIES OF SURGICAL PATIENTS (1958); I.L. JANIS & L. MANN, DECISION
MAKING: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT, CHOICE, AND COMMITMENT
(1977)).
53. Andrews, supra note 45, at 222-23.
54. T. CHRISTOFFEL, HEALTH AND THE LAW 288 (1981).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Robertson, supra note 21, at 487.
58. Mulford, supra note 30, at 105.
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pend on research productivity.59 This conflict is exemplified by the
one human experiment with gene therapy conducted to date, 6° in
which the researchers failed to conduct preliminary animal tests
before proceeding with the human experiment.6 ' In that case, it is
apparent that the researchers' personal ethical restraints were insufficient to prevent them from attempting to effect a premature
62
cure.

Such experiments led to a fear that reliance upon an investigator's sense of ethical responsibility is an insufficient safeguard of
the human subject's rights. In response to this fear, institutional
review boards ("IRB's") were developed to provide outside review
of proposed research projects.63 IRB's consist of lay persons and
professionals, and are typically established by institutions such as
hospitals, universities, and private research centers. 6 Currently,
all institutions that receive federal research grants for human subject research are required to establish IRB's. 65 IRB's are estab-

lished as a safeguard, in addition to informed consent, to ensure
that experimental subjects are fully informed of risks and that they
are given the opportunity to forego participation.66
IRB's must determine if the risks involved in an experiment are
reasonable compared to the anticipated benefits for both the prospective subjects and the public in general. 67 IRB's must also determine whether legally effective informed consent has been
obtained and whether the rights and welfare of research subjects
have been adequately protected. 6 Additionally, IRB's must periodically review any ongoing research projects. 69 Although IRB's
obtain their primary mandate from governmental regulations, each
group must implement the basic principles according to the nature
59. Robertson, supra note 21, at 487.
60. Sun, Cline Loses the NIH Grants, 214 Sci. 1220 (1981).
61. Kolata & Wade, Human Gene Treatment Stirs New Debate, 210 Sci. 407 (1980).
A team of researchers at the University of California at Los Angeles attempted to treat
two patients suffering from beta-zero thalassemia (a life threatening disease attributed to
a single gene defect) with recombinant DNA techniques. Id.
62. McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 186.
63. Mulford, supra note 30, at 108. See generally Cowan, Human Experimentation:
The Review Process in Practice, 25 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 533 (1975) (describing the
operation and structure of institutional review boards).
64. D. MALONEY, PROTECTION OF HUMAN RESEARCH SUBJECTS 47 (1984).
65. 45 C.F.R. § 46.11l(a)(2) (1985); 21 C.F.R. § 56.111(a)(2) (1985).
66. Note, supra note 35, at 137.
67. Schwartz, InstitutionalReview of Medical Research: Cost-Benefit Analysis, RiskBenefit Analysis, and the Possible Effects of Research on Public Policy, 4 J. LEGAL MED.
143, 145 (1983).
68. Robertson, supra note 21, at 491.
69. Id.
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and structure of the particular institution.7 ° This system has the
advantage of maximizing institutional and investigator autonomy
while protecting human subjects from unreasonable risks.7
III.

DISCUSSION

A. Federal Regulation of Informed Consent to Human
Experimentation
In 1974, the Department of Health & Human Services ("HHS")
promulgated regulations which apply to all research carried out or
funded by the department. 72 These regulations identify eight basic
elements of informed consent for research projects utilizing human
subjects.73 The purpose of these eight elements is to ensure that a
prospective subject receives information sufficient to enable him to
make an informed decision. 74 The prospective subject should receive: (1) an explanation of the purpose of the research and notification that the procedure to be followed represents a departure
from established practice;75 (2) a description of the risks and discomforts which may reasonably be expected; 76 (3) a description of
any benefits to the subject or others which may reasonably be expected; 77 (4) a statement describing the extent to which the confi70.
71.

R.

GREENWALD & M. RYAN, supra note 37, at 51.
Robertson, supra note 21, at 544.

72. 30 Fed. Reg. 18,914 (1974). These regulations are presently codified at 45 C.F.R.
§ 46.101(a) (1985).
73. See infra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
74. R. LEVINE, supra note 42, at 73-89; R. GREENWALD & M. RYAN, supra note 37,
at 83.
75. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(1) (1985) (informed consent shall include an explanation of
the purposes of the research); see L. GLANTZ, COMMENTARY: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
EXCISED TISSUE IRB: A REVIEW OF HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH 5-6 (1979). This
information enables the prospective subject to decline participation in a research project
when he does not share the researchers' goals. For example, an individual might not wish
to participate in an experiment conducted to increase knowledge concerning racial superiority. Id.
45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(1) (1985) (informed consent shall include identification of any
procedures which are experimental). This information alerts the individual to the fact
that the outcome of the therapy is less certain than that of conventional therapy. R.
LEVINE, supra note 42, at 73. A physician/investigator who treats a patient without
explaining that the therapy varies from established practice may be held liable for failure
to obtain adequate informed consent. Id.
76. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(2) (1985); 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(a)(2) (1985); see R. LEVINE,
supra note 42, at 76. Deciding how much information concerning possible risks to disclose is a delicate issue because both overdisclosure and underdisclosure can affect the
process of informed consent. Id.
77. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(3) (1985); 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(a)(3) (1985); see R. LEVINE,
supra note 42, at 80. Hoped-for benefits to society and the subject are usually well described although possibly exaggerated by enthusiastic researchers. Where a therapy is
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dentiality of the subject's records will be preserved;18 (5) a
statement of whether any alternative treatments exist; 79 (6) a description of the availability of medical therapy or compensation in
case of injury incurred as a result of the experiment;8 0 (7) an opportunity to ask questions concerning the experiment;8 and (8) an assurance that the subject is free to refuse to participate or to
withdraw his consent and discontinue participation at any time
without penalty or loss of benefits to which he is otherwise
entitled.82
In addition to these elements, the HHS regulations require that
the following information must be provided to each subject when
appropriate: a statement that the procedure may involve unforeseeable risks, the anticipated circumstances under which the subject's participation may be terminated, the consequences of a
subject's decision to withdraw from the research, and a statement
that any information concerning significant new discoveries developed during the course of the experiment will be provided to the
subject.83
innovative and a major purpose is to benefit directly the subject patient, it should be made
clear that the physician also wants to learn more about the patient's disorder and that the
patient is not therefore the only intended beneficiary. Id.
78. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(5) (1985).
79. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(4) (1985); 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(a)(4) (1985); R. LEVINE,
supra note 42, at 80. Informed consent should include a statement of whether any alternative treatments exist so that the prospective subject can evaluate the benefits and risks
of participating. Id. In research situations where the subject is also a patient, it is important to informed him of which treatments would be used if he did not consent to participate in the experiment. Id. at 74. The prospective subject can then decide whether he
wishes to subject himself to possible inconveniences or risks as a result of superfluous
experimental procedures. Id. This is especially important where the subject will be foregoing a more traditional therapy as a result of the time that elapses during the experimental period. Id. at 80.
80. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(6) (1985); 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(a)(6) (1985); see Robertson,
Compensating Injured Research Subjects: II The Law, 6 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 29
(1976). The physician or researcher should emphasize that it is not always possible to
restore the health of people who are injured or become ill as a result of participating in
experimental research. Id. at 30. If a subject is not informed that he bears the risk of
physical injury, his consent cannot justify risks that are undertaken wholly or partially
for the benefit of others. Id. at 29.
81. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(7) (1985); 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(a)(7) (1985); F. RozovsKY,
supra note 43, at 29.
82. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(8) (1985); 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(a)(8) (1985); R. LEVINE,
supra note 42, at 88. The right to withdraw is derived from the premise that the subject is
doing something for the benefit of others and that such gratuitous acts are generally not
obligatory. This right is especially important in situations where the relationship between
the researcher and the subject is that of physician-patient or faculty-student because the
subject in such circumstances is susceptible to coercion. Id. at 84.
83. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(b) (1985).
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The regulations state that consent must be obtained from prospective research subjects or their legally authorized representatives, 4 and there must be written documentation that information
concerning the proposed procedure was given.85 In obtaining consent, no undue influence or coercion may be used.8 6 All information presented to the prospective subject or his representative must
be in understandable language.8 7 The regulations further provide
that neither the researcher, the institution, nor the sponsor may be
released from liability through the subject's oral or written consent. 8 The regulations also specifically address research involving
fetuses, pregnant women, human in vitro fertilizations, 9 and
children. 90
According to the regulations, institutions conducting federally
funded research must have an IRB to review and approve research
projects.9 ' The regulations specify the composition of the IRB.92
The duties of the IRB are to include approving information given
to prospective subjects and ensuring that the subjects receive any
information that, in the judgment of the IRB, is relevant to the
rights and welfare of the subject. 93
The Food and Drug Administration ["FDA"] has promulgated
regulations which are very similar to those of HHS. 94 The FDA
84. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (1985). A "legally authorized representative" is an individual
or judicial or other body authorized under applicable law to consent, on behalf of a prospective subject, to the subject's participation. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d) (1985).
85. 45 C.F.R. § 46.117 (1985). The elements may be listed on a long form, or a short
form may be signed which states that the subject or his representative has been presented
orally with the required information. Oral presentation of the information must be
witnessed.
86. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (1985) (the researcher or physician shall seek consent only
under circumstances that minimize the possibility of coercion or undue influence, and the
prospective subject or his representative must be provided sufficient opportunity to consider whether or not to participate).
87. Id.

88. Id. (no informed consent, whether oral or written, may include any exculpatory
language through which the subject or the representative is made to waive or appear to
waive any of the subject's legal rights).
89.
90.
91.

45 C.F.R. § 46.201 (1985).
45 C.F.R. § 46.401 (1985).
45 C.F.R. § 46.103 (1985).

92. 45 C.F.R. § 46.107 (1985) (each IRB must have at least five members of varying
backgrounds; must not consist entirely of men or entirely of women; must include at least
one member with a nonscientific background; must include at least one member who is
not otherwise affiliated with the institution; and must not include any member with a
conflicting interest).
93. 45 C.F.R. § 46.109 (1985).
94. 21 C.F.R. § 50.20 (1981); see supra notes 72-87 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the HHS regulations.
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sets forth the same eight basic elements of informed consent. 95
There are, however, some differences in the FDA regulations.
First, the subject must be informed that his records may be inspected by the FDA. 96 Second, the written consent requirements
may be waived when it is determined that the research poses no
more than a minimal risk97 of harm to the subjects or where the
procedure is one for which written permission normally is not required outside the research setting. 98 Finally, the general requirements for informed consent do not apply where obtaining informed
consent is not feasible prior to the procedure, 99 or where the proce-

dure is necessary to preserve the life of the subject and there is not
adequate time to seek an independent assessment."°
B.

State Regulation of Informed Consent to Human
Experimentation

State statutory treatment of informed consent to human experimentation runs the gamut from comprehensive, specific coverage
of the issue to general treatment in informed consent statutes. California, New York, and Virginia have enacted legislation which
specifically addresses informed consent to human experimentation. 10 1 These states require that in order to obtain proper in95. 21 C.F.R. § 50.25 (1981). See supra notes 73-82 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the basic elements of informed consent.
96. 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(a)(5) (1985).
97. 21 C.F.R. § 56.102(i) (1985) (minimal risks are defined as risks not greater than
those ordinarily encountered in daily life or during the performance of routine physical or
psychological examinations or tests).
98. 21 C.F.R. §§ 50.27, 56.109(c) (1985).
99. 21 C.F.R. § 50.23 (1985) (this provision regulates the use of any "test article,"
which is defined as any drug, medical device for human use, human food additive, color
additive, or electronic product. 21 C.F.R. § 50.3(k) (1985)).
100. 21 C.F.R. § 50.23 (1985).
101. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24172 (West 1984); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
§ 2441 (McKinney 1985); VA. CODE § 37.1-234 (1984).
The statutes of New York and Virginia provide that researchers conducting experimentation in compliance with federal regulations concerning the protection of human
subjects are exempt from the state requirements. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2445 (McKinney 1985); VA. CODE § 37.1-237 (1984).
California provides that researchers conducting investigations within institutions holding federal assurances who obtain informed consent as required by federal regulations are
exempt from the requirements except for the bill of rights provisions concerning the elements of informed consent, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24172 (West 1984), and
penalties (CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24176 (West 1984). These sections set forth
fines and terms of imprisonment for any person who is primarily responsible for the conduct of an experiment (including a representative or employee of a pharmaceutical company who is directly responsible for contracting with the subject) and who negligently
allows such an experiment to be conducted without the subject's informed consent, or
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formed consent, researchers must provide the following
information to subjects: an explanation of the procedures, drugs,
or devices to be used in the experiment; a disclosure of appropriate
alternatives; a description of any risks and discomforts that might
be expected; an explanation of possible benefits; an offer to answer
the subject's questions concerning the experiment and its effects;
and an instruction that the individual's consent to participate in
the experiment may be withdrawn at any time without prejudice.' 02
In order to provide the prospective subject free power of choice,
these statutes also require that the informed consent be obtained
without force, deceit, fraud, duress, constraint or coercion. 103 The
California statute requires that the prospective subject be informed
of available treatments in the event that injury or illness results
from participation in the experiment.' °4 New York and Virginia
require that any institution or agency which conducts or proposes
to conduct research with human subjects must establish an IRB.105
Louisiana and Florida have also passed legislation which deals
specifically with informed consent to human experimentation.
Both of these states require informed consent before an experiment
with a human subject may be performed. 106 Unlike the states diswho willfully fails to obtain the subject's informed consent, whether or not the subject
sustains injury.
102. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24172 (West 1984); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW
§ 2441 (McKinney 1985); VA. CODE § 37.1-234 (1984).
103. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24172 (West 1984); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
§ 2441 (McKinney 1985); VA. CODE § 37.1-234 (1984).
104. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24172 (West 1984).
105. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2444 (McKinney 1985). This statute dictates the
composition of the board and prohibits its members from reviewing research in which
they have a conflicting interest. Id. The board must review each proposed research project, evaluate the costs and benefits to the prospective subjects and ensure that the risks
are outweighed by the importance of the knowledge to be gained. Id.
VA. CODE § 37.1-236 (1984). This statute provides that the board is to be composed of
representatives of varied professional backgrounds. Id. The board must take the following factors into consideration in deciding whether or not to authorize human research:
the adequacy of the researcher's description of the potential benefits and risks involved;
the adequacy of the methodology of the research; whether any nontherapeutic research
presents a hazardous risk to the human subjects; whether the risks to the human subjects
are outweighed by the potential benefits to them; the adequacy of the informed consent
form; and whether the voluntary informed consent is to be obtained by adequate and
appropriate methods. Id. The board is also responsible for deciding if the persons proposing to conduct human research are qualified and competent. Researchers must submit periodic reports on existing research projects and the board must ensure that such
research is being carried out in conformity with the approved proposal. Id.
California provides that where human subjects are used for the experimental testing of
drugs, an IRB must review and approve the experiment and consent procedures. CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 26668 (West 1984).
106. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:87.2 (West 1974) (providing that experimentation on
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cussed above, however, neither Louisiana nor Florida provides any
detailed guidance regarding what information must be given to the
prospective subject.
Some states have enacted legislation concerning human experimentation as part of general patients' rights laws. 10 7 Many such
statutes provide only that the patient has the right to refuse to
serve as a research subject, and do not require the informed consent of the patient.10 8 Some patients' rights laws require that the
prospective subject receive information concerning the experimental procedure, but do not specify what information must be included to obtain informed consent. 0 9 Other statutes address
research on human subjects in miscellaneous provisions, but do not
set forth any informed consent requirements. 110
The majority of states have not dealt specifically with informed
consent to human experimentation, but have instead enacted general informed consent statutes."' In states without human experia live-born human without his consent is punishable by hard labor or fine). FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 458.331(l)(u), 460.413(l)(t) (West 1981) (physicians); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 459.015(1)(u) (West 1981) (osteopaths); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 466.028(1)(x) (West 1981)
(dentists) (professional ethics standards mandate informed consent).
107. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 70E (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1985) (patients
have the right to refuse to participate in experimentation); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 333.20201 (West 1980) (patients have the right to receive information concerning an
experimental procedure and may refuse to participate); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.651(13)
(West Supp. 1986) (informed consent required); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 198.088(b), (c)
(Vernon 1983) (informed consent required); NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.720 (1985) (patients
have the right to refuse to participate in experimentation); OR. REV. STAT. § 441.605(3)
(1983) (patients have the right to receive information concerning an experimental procedure and may refuse to participate); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-19.1(10) (1982) (patients
have the right to receive information concerning an experimental procedure and may
refuse to participate); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 74.42.040(4) (1982) (informed consent
required).
108. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 70E (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1985); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 333.20201(2)(H) (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.651(13) (West
Supp. 1986); NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.720 (1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-19.1(10)
(1982).
109. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.20201(2)(H) (West 1980).
110. The following states provide that cancer research will be conducted: FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 381.3712 (Supp. 1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1401 (1978); N.J. REV.
STAT. §§ 52:9U-2 to 52:9U-9 (1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 5633-5637 (Purdon
1985).
The following states provide that research on human genetics will be conducted:
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 144.91-144.94 (West 1970); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.310-191.331
(Vernon Supp. 1986) (all testing results will be confidential).
Illinois has established an experimental organ transplantation procedures board which
must determine the eligibility of subjects for experimental transplant procedures. ILL.

REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2,
6601-6605 (1985).
111. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.556 (1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6852 (Supp.
1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.46 (West Supp. 1986); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 671-3 (1976
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mentation legislation, these general statutes will control. " 2 Many
informed consent statutes address experimentation with particular
groups such as the mentally disabled' 3 or children."I4 Other stat& Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4301 TO 39-4306 (1985); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 147.137 (West Supp. 1985); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 304.40 to 320 (1981); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 40:1299.40 (West 1977); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2905 (Supp. 1985);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2816 (1984); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.1 10 (1981); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 507-C:1(III), 507-C:2(II) (1983); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2805-d
(McKinney 1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.13 (1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2317.54 (Page 1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 677.097 (1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40,
§ 1301.103 (Purdon Supp. 1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19-32 (Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 29-26-118 (1980); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4950i, §§ 6.01-6.07 (Vernon
Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-5 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1909 (Supp.
1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.70.050, 7.70.060 (Supp. 1986). For an analysis of

these statutes, see Andrews, supra note 45. Twenty-three states mandate obtaining informed consent to health care. Id. at 178. Of these states, twenty-one require that risks
be disclosed. Id. at 195. Ten states require disclosure of alternatives to the proposed
treatment. Id. at 197.
112. INFORMED CONSENT, supra note 7, at 38; see, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 1909 (Supp. 1985) (providing that the professional must disclose risks, benefits, and
alternatives to the proposed treatment).
113. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-561 (1986) (no experimental drugs shall be administered by the department of health services to any patient); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 591416(15) (Supp. 1979) (patients have the right to refuse to participate); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 24175 (West 1984) (informed consent given by a person other than the
subject is limited to medical experiments related to maintaining or improving the health
of the subject or to obtaining information about the subject's pathological condition);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 5171-5176 (Supp. 1984) (pharmaceutical research; no mentally ill patient may be approached to participate if he is incapable of understanding the
nature and consequences of his consent; informed consent shall include information concerning the nature of the proposed procedure, risks, and alternatives); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 6-1969 (1981) (informed consent required); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 393.12(6), (7) (West
Supp. 1986) (informed consent shall be obtained from the patient, if competent, or his
parent or legal guardian; the consent shall include information concerning the nature and
consequences of the proposed procedure; the risks, benefits, and purposes; and whether
alternative procedures are available); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 334E-1 (Supp. 1984) (informed consent must be obtained before any nonemergency treatment for mental illness
can commence); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 334E-2(10) (Supp. 1984) (patients have the right
to refuse to participate); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, 2-110 (1985) (informed consent
required); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2929(6) (1983) (consent of patient and parent or
guardian is required); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34, § 2143(8) (1978) (informed consent
shall be obtained from the patient, if competent; if incompetent, the consent of his guardian shall be obtained; the consent shall include information concerning the nature and
consequences of the experimental procedures, the risks, benefits and purposes, and available alternate procedures); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 630.192-630.198 (Vernon Supp. 1986)
(biomedical or pharmacological research is prohibited unless it is intended to relieve or
prevent a disabling condition or there is a reasonable expectation of direct therapeutic
benefit to the patient; no involuntarily committed patient shall participate in any research; the patient must receive information concerning the risks, benefits and procedures); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 630.115 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (informed consent of patient or
his parent or guardian is required); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-20-147 (1985) (informed
consent of patient, if he is capable, and of parents or guardian is required); N.J. REV.
STAT. § 30:4-24.2(d)(2) (1981) (express informed consent must be obtained before partici-
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utes focus on research involving particular drugs such as conpation in experimental research; if the patient has been adjudicated incompetent, a court
hearing must be held to determine the necessity of the procedure; a patient may not
participate unless the research is directly related to specific goals of his treatment); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 43-1-15(A) (1979) (informed consent of patient or guardian is required);
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2444 (McKinney 1985) (informed consent required); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 122C-57(f) (Supp. 1985) (informed consent of the patient or his guardian is
required); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-01.2-11 (Supp. 1985) (court must determine that the
experimental procedure is in the best interests of the recipient and that no less drastic
measures are feasible); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.1-40(12) (1978) (informed consent of
patient or patient's guardian is required); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.271 (Baldwin
1985) (informed consent to unusually hazardous treatments is required); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 426.385(2) (1983) (informed consent to unusual treatment is required); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 475.325(6) (1983) (experimental drug research; where a patient is unable to give informed consent and consent is obtained from third parties, experimental drugs may be
administered only for the purpose of diagnosing, treating, or mitigating a disease or injury of the patient); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-23-1010 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (the patient has
the right to refuse any treatment not recognized as standard psychiatric treatment); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 27A-12-20, 27A-12-21 (1984) (informed consent must be obtained from the patient if 18 years of age or older, from the guardian or the parent if the
patient is less than 18 years of age); TEX. MENTAL HEALTH CODE ANN. § 5547-90(b)(3)
(1986) (patients have the right to refuse to participate); VA. CODE § 37.1-235 (1984) (informed consent of subject, witnessed by subject's legally authorized representative, is required; representative may not consent to nontherapeutic research unless a review
committee approves); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.61 (West Supp. 1985) (informed consent of
patient and guardian is required); Wyo. STAT. § 25-5-132(d)(ii) (1982) (patient has the
right to refuse to participate in experimentation unless he or his guardian (if the patient is
a minor) have given informed consent).
The following states limit research on subjects incapable of giving informed consent to
experiments not presenting a hazardous risk: CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24175(e)
(West 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5175 (Supp. 1984); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.

§ 5122.271(A)(5) (Baldwin 1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 426.385(2) (1983); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 44-23-1010 (Law. Co-op. 1976); VA. CODE § 37.1-235 (1984).
The following states require review and approval of the proposed research before the
informed consent of the patient is sought: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5173 (Supp. 1984)
(IRB); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-1969 (1981) (Department of Human Services); Mo ANN.
STAT. § 630.193 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (IRB); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-20-147 (1985)
(mental disabilities board of visitors); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2444 (McKinney 1985)
(IRB and the Commissioner of Health); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 27A-12-21 (1984)
(state board of charities and corrections); VA. CODE § 37.1-236 (1984) (IRB); Wis. STAT.
§ 51.61(l)j) (West Supp. 1985) (IRB).
See S. BRAKEL, J. PARRY, B. WEINER, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW

(1985) (state-by-state survey of laws concerning the mentally disabled).
114.

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 26668.4 (West 1984) (experimental use of

drugs; parent or guardian's consent must be obtained; if the subject is seven years of age
or older, then both her consent and that of the parent or guardian must be obtained;
consent is limited to experimentation is related to the maintenance or improvement of the
subject's health or to gathering information about the subject's pathological condition);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 /2, $ 2-110 (1985) (the child's parent or guardian is authorized,
only with the approval of the court, to provide informed consent for the child); N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2442 (McKinney 1985) (written consent must be obtained from
the minor's parent or guardian); OR. REV. STAT. § 475.325(5) (1983) (experimental drug
research; parent's or guardian's consent must be obtained); VA. CODE § 37.1-235 (1984)
(if minor is capable of giving voluntary, informed consent, then the consent of both the
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C. Judicial Regulation of Informed Consent to Nontherapeutic
Experimentation
Little if any American case law exists concerning the topic of
informed consent to nontherapeutic human experimentation," 8
that is, research pursued for the acquisition of basic knowledge,
minor and his legally authorized representative must be obtained; no legally authorized
representative may consent to nontherapeutic experimentation unless an IRB determines
that such research will not pose a hazardous risk to the subject).
Experimental research utilizing children as subjects raises issues of consent because
many children are incapable of sufficiently comprehending information concerning the
experiment to meet the standards of consent. See R. LEVINE, supra note 42, at 156.
Testing on children is, however, necessary because adequate information cannot always
be obtained through experimentation with adult subjects. INFORMED CONSENT, supra
note 7, at 63. Children cannot be treated as "little people" because, for example, drug
tests performed on adults will not give information as to the effect on children of toxicity,
dosage, side effects, or efficacy. Id.
115. ALA. CODE §§ 20-2-52, 20-3-53 (1984); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-2601-362606 (Supp. 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 25-5-901-25-5-907 (1982); HAWAII REV. STAT.
§ 329-32 (1976); IDAHO CODE §§ 37-2716 to 37-2718 (1973); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-483-3 to 35-48-3-5 (West 1976); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 240.301-240.305 (West 1969); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 8 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 152.12(3)
(West Supp. 1985); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-29-125 to 41-29-131 (1981); N.J. REV.
STAT. §§ 26:2L-1-26:2L-9 (1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-102 (1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§§ 21-28.4-1 to 21-28.4-11 (1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-4-123 (Law. Co-op. 1976);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 53-14-101-53-14-114 (Supp. 1985); VA. CODE §§ 524-524.3
(1982); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 161.335 (West 1974).
116. ALA. CODE §§ 20-2-11-20-2-120 (1984) (IRB approval required); ALASKA
STAT. §§ 17-35.010-17.35.500 (1983); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11260-11270
(West 1985) (IRB approval required); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56 1/2, 711 (1985); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2401-2410 (1980) (IRB approval required); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 152.21 (West Supp. 1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3719.85-3719.99 (Baldwin 1985)
(IRB approval required); VA. CODE § 4471 (1982).
117. ALA. CODE § 08.64.367 (1984); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-2451-36-2453
(1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21a-67 (West 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16,
§§ 4901-4905 (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.333 (1981); IDAHO CODE § 18-7301A
(1977); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-8-8-1 to 16-8-8-7 (1978); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-6b0165-6b08 (1978); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 311.950-311.966 (1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 37:1285.1 (West Supp. 1985); id. at § 40:676 (West 1974); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 5041-101-50-41-107 (1985); N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 24:6F-1-24:6F-5 (1985); N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 23 to 23.1-01 (1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 2-313.1-2-313.6 (West 1984); OR.
REV. STAT. § 689.535 (1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.54.130 (1986); W. VA.
CODE §§ 16-5A-9a, 16-5A-10, 30-5-16a (1985).
118. T. CHRISTOFFEL, supra note 54, at 291 (most cases are settled out of court or
result in mild punishments); Sabiston, The Boundaries Between Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects and the Accepted or Routine PracticeofMedicine, with Particular
Emphasis on Innovation in the Practiceof Surgery, in THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL
PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH, App. vol. 1, at 17-1 (1978).
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not intended to benefit directly the subject. However, one Canadian case involved a nontherapeutic experimental procedure about
which the human subject did not receive adequate information. 11 9
The subject was told that the experiment employed a new drug
which was "perfectly safe," that the test had been conducted many
times previously, and that it involved a simple incision in his arm
and the insertion of a catheter.12 ° The subject signed a consent
form which stated that he fully understood the proposed procedure
and which purported to absolve the researchers, technicians, and
institution of all liability. 2 ' The actual experimental procedure
was more complex than that described to the subject, 122 and it resulted in the cessation of the subject's heart beat, necessitating immediate surgery and a fourteen-day hospital stay.1 23 The subject
received $22,500 in damages in a jury verdict which was appealed
by the researchers.124 Finding that the subject was inadequately
informed, the appellate court held that the duty of disclosure in an
experimental setting is "as great as, if not greater than" 2 the usual
duty of disclosure between a physician and his patient.

1

D. Judicial Regulation of Informed Consent to Therapeutic
Experimentation
Although courts have traditionally emphasized the importance
of following standard medical procedures,1 26 a Michigan court ac119. Halushka v. University of Saskatchewan, 53 D.L.R.2d 436 (Sask. 1965). Some
commentators believe that United States courts would probably analyze this case in the
same manner as did the Canadian appellate court. INFORMED CONSENT, supra note 7, at
18.
120. Halushka v. University of Saskatchewan, 53 D.L.R.2d 436, 437-38 (Sask. 1965).
121. Id. at 438.
122. Id. at 439 (the catheter was inserted into the subject's arm and threaded through
his heart and into the pulmonary artery; anesthesia was then introduced into the artery).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 436.
125. Id. at 443-44. The court noted that the subject had not been informed that the
particular anesthetic used had never been tested before or that there were specific risks
involved. Id. at 444. The court used the "reasonable man" standard in determining that
the subject of medical experimentation is entitled to be fully informed of all the facts and
probabilities which a reasonable man might be expected to consider before giving his
consent. Id.
126. Owens v. McCleary, 313 Mo. 213, 223, 281 S.W. 682, 685 (1926) (failing to use
methods followed or approved by a physician's school of practice evidences either ignorance or experimentation); Sawdey v. Spokane Falls & N. Ry., 30 Wash. 349, 360, 70 P.
972, 975 (1902) (the physician must not experiment but must instead treat the patient
with a therapy that is recognized by the medical profession); Allen v. Voje, 114 Wis. 1,
22-23, 89 N.W. 924, 932 (1902) (treatments which are not established by professional
practice should be employed only when the patient's condition is critical and death would
certainly occur absent experimentation).
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knowledged, in dicta, that there must be experimentation in order
to further the progress of medicine.' 27 The court added, however,
that such experimentation must be done with the subject's knowledge and consent. 2 '
The requirements of informed consent to therapeutic experimentation, that is, experimental therapy intended to be of direct benefit
to the subject,' 2 9 have traditionally been less stringent than those
imposed in the nontherapeutic setting, particularly where a doctorpatient relationship is involved. 30 This relaxation of informed
consent requirements is due in part to a therapeutic privilege which
assumes that a physician is dedicated to the principle of first doing
no harm,' 3 ' and that safeguards are therefore not necessary to protect the interests of a patient in a therapeutic setting.'
Although
the application of the therapeutic privilege does not preempt the
patient's right to decide whether to consent to treatment, in practice the privilege has been used
in place of rather than in conjunc33
tion with informed consent.

Jurisdictions differ as to the standard to be applied in determining the extent of required disclosure for consent to therapeutic experimentation. 3 4 The majority of jurisdictions apply the standard
of the "reasonable physician.""'

Under this standard, the physi-

cian must disclose the level of information that practitioners of his
discipline would normally disclose. 136 The medical community
127. Fortner v. Koch, 272 Mich. 273, 282, 261 N.W. 762, 765 (1935).
128. Id.
129. INFORMED CONSENT, supra note 7, at 2.
130. Id. at 21. See Salgo v. Leland, 317 P.2d 170, 181, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 578
(1957) (the mental and emotional condition of a patient may be critical; a physician may
therefore exercise discretion in discussing risk with the patient).
131. Mulford, supra note 30, at 104-05. (this principle is reflected in the professional
maxim: primum non nocere-"first of all do no harm").
132. Id.
133. See Andrews, supra note 45, at 211-15.
134. Cowan & Bertsch, Innovative Therapy: The Responsibility of Hospitals, 5 J.
LEGAL MED. 219, 231 (1984).
135. See Trichter, Informed Consent: The Patientas an Individual, 15 FORUM 455
(1980); see, e.g., Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 845
(1974); Stauffer v. Karabin, 30 Colo. App. 357, 492 P.2d 862 (1971); Natanson v. Kline,
186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960).
See J. AREEN, P. KING, S. GOLDBERG & A. CAPRON, LAW, SCIENCE AND MEDICINE
384 n.4 (1984). "[A]s of 1982, 26 states that had declared law on informed consent had
adopted a professional standard of disclosure, 19 a patient-oriented standard, and 6 had
no law on the subject." See 1 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL
PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING

206-45 (1982) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S COMMIS(a state-by-state survey of standards of disclosure).
136. Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 845 (1974).
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therefore determines the nature and scope of disclosure. 3' 7 Plaintiffs alleging a lack of informed consent usually must present expert
testimony by medical practitioners both to establish the standard
and to prove that the risk
at issue was "material" to the patient's
38
decision to participate.1
For example, in a 1974 case, the patient signed a consent document agreeing to the temporary use of a mechanical heart and subsequent human and animal heart transplants in the event that
cardiac surgery was unsuccessful. 39 Both transplants failed and
the patient died. 140 The patient's widow sued, alleging that the
physicians had failed to obtain adequate informed consent. 141 The
trial court directed a verdict for the physicians and the decision
was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit. 42 The court applied the "reasonable physician" standard in determining whether the physicians
had obtained informed consent. 4 3 The appellate court based its
decision on the fact that the plaintiff had not presented expert testimony establishing a higher standard of disclosure.44
A minority of jurisdictions apply the "reasonable patient" standard, also known as the "materiality standard." 145 Under the "reasonable patient" standard, the duty to inform is determined by the
informational needs of patients in general. 146 A risk is material
when a reasonable person in the patient's position would attach
significance to particular information in deciding whether to forego
the proposed treatment.' 47 In deciding to apply the "reasonable
patient" standard instead of the "reasonable physician" standard,
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that
137. Cowan & Bertsch, supra note 134, at 232.
138. Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 628,
640 (1970). A risk is material when a reasonable person in the patient's position would be
likely to attach significance to the risk in deciding whether or not to undergo a proposed
treatment.
139. Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408, 412-13 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 845
(1974).
140. Id. at 420.
141. Id. at 411.
142. Id. at 408.
143. Id. at 420.
144. Id. at 421.
145. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972); J. AREEN, P. KING, S. GOLDBERG & A. CAPRON, supra note 135, at 384
n.4. Nineteen states have adopted a reasonable patient standard. See, e.g., DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 18, § 6852(a)(2) (Supp. 1982); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 135, at
206-45 (state-by-state survey of standards of disclosure).
146. Cowan & Bertsch, supra note 134, at 232.
147. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972).
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issues involved in nondisclosure cases are not absolutely within the
domain of the medical profession.'4 8 The court, in applying the
"reasonable patient" standard, dispensed with the expert witness
requirement.

49

A third standard for disclosure is the "individual patient standard," whereby the scope of disclosure is determined by an individual patient's need to know enough to make an intelligent
decision.15

A determination of materiality is based on whether

knowledge of the risk at issue would have affected the patient's
decision.15 ' The plaintiff must prove not only that he was injured as
a result of undergoing treatment, but also that he would not have
152
consented had he been informed of a particular material risk.
For example, in a recent case 53 the plaintiff alleged that she did
not give an informed consent to surgical treatment because the
physician did not disclose that there was a viable alternative to
surgery."5 4 Applying the "reasonable patient" standard, the trial
court determined that a reasonable person would have consented
even if apprised of the alternative and therefore ruled in favor of
the physician.' 55 The Supreme Court of Oklahoma reversed the
decision, finding that there was no informed consent because the
plaintiff herself would not have consented if adequately informed. 56 In an earlier case, the supreme court had stated that
where the plaintiff would have foregone the proposed therapy if
adequately informed, but a "reasonable patient" would have consented under the same circumstances, application of the "reasonable patient" standard would result in an irrevocable loss of the
patient's right of self-determination. 57
148. Id. (the patient had not been informed that total loss of hearing was a possibility
in stapedectomy operations).
149. Id.
150. Only Oklahoma has explicitly adopted this standard at present. See Scott v.
Bradford, 606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979); cf Fain v. Smith, 479 So. 2d 1150 (Ala. 1985) The
Fain court applied a different version of the "reasonable person" test: the trier of fact
must consider "what a reasonable person with all of the characteristics of the plaintiff,
including his idiosyncrasies and religious beliefs, would have done under the same circumstances." Id. at 1155. This variation is actually closer to the "individual patient"
standard than the "reasonable person" standard. Id. at 1164 (Adams, J., dissenting).
151. Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 559 (Okla. 1979).
152. Id.
153. Smith v. Karen S. Reisig, M.D., Inc., 686 P.2d 285 (Okla. 1984).
154. Id. at 287-88 (the plaintiff underwent a hysterectomy and was not informed that
treatment by hormonal therapy was a viable alternative).
155. Id. at 288.
156. Id.
157. Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 559 (Okla. 1979).
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OBSERVATIONS

Researchers will soon begin experimenting with recombinant
DNA gene therapy as a way of altering the genetic structure of
living human beings.1 58 There are many unanswered questions regarding the risks inherent in the manipulation of human genes.1 59
Thus, there is a great danger that subjects will agree to participate
in genetic experimentation without knowing enough about the
risks involved to give informed consent." 6 Safeguards are necessary not only to preserve the autonomy of the individual, 61 but
also to guide researchers and physicians and protect them from
liability. A requirement of informed consent and IRB approval of
proposed research and the consent process would ensure that the
prospective subject is apprised of the risks and that the researcher
is not performing experiments with human subjects prematurely.
A.

The Necessity for State Legislation

In order to provide guidance to researchers and physicians attempting to obtain valid informed consent, states should enact legislation which sets forth with specificity the required elements of
informed consent. While federal regulations cover research situations where federal funding is involved 62 and a few states have
statutorily mandated informed consent to human experimentation,1 63 the majority of states fail to provide any detailed guidance
to researchers and physicians applying new therapies. 6"
There is little disagreement concerning the basic elements of in158. McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 186.
159. Chi. Tribune, Mar. 2, 1986, at 18, col. 4. The Executive Secretary of the National Institute of Health concedes that "gene tinkering is still a 'black box'-nobody
knows for sure what will happen when you put a new gene into a person's body." Id.
It is possible that the "new" gene introduced into the individual's cells might escape
from the diseased cells and spread to healthy cells, resulting in harm to previously unaffected tissues. See Anderson & Fletcher, Gene Therapy in Human Beings: When Is It
Ethical to Begin?, 303 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1293 (1980); Mercola & Cline, The Potentials
of Inserting New Genetic Information, 303 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1297 (1980).
160. See Capron, The Law of Genetic Therapy, in J. KATZ, supra note 28, at 574.
"People in this country have been weaned on newspaper accounts of exciting new cures.
Particularly in the field of [genetics], patients are pressing their doctors to be the subjects
of innovation." Id. at 575 (paraphrasing Dr. Francis D. Moore).
161. Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93
(1914). "Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine
what shall be done with his own body .... "
162. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 106-17 and accompanying text.
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formed consent. 6 The federal regulations and the statutes of California, New York, and Virginia contain most of the same
elements. 166 However, there are differences. None of the state statutes requires that the subject receive information concerning the
extent of confidentiality to be preserved. This element will become
167
increasingly necessary as exploration of gene therapy increases,
since an individual's genetic background will be the object of
treatment.
Only federal and California regulations require that the prospective subject receive information concerning the availability of medical treatment in the event that injury or illness results from
participation in an experiment.1 6 This information is critical since
it determines whether the subject has any recourse beyond monetary compensation. Although it may not always be possible for the
researcher to predict what might go wrong in an experiment, much
less to predict what treatments mights be available to correct the
injury, the researcher should at least disclose that those factors are
unknown and thus allow the subject to decide whether to assume
unknown risks.
Federal regulations provide that a subject must be informed that
he will receive information concerning significant new discoveries
which develop during the course of the experiment, 169 while state
70
statutes are silent on this element. In both the Tuskegee incident
and the Willowbrook project, 17 1 the experiments continued long after the discovery of medical cures. In order to prevent the recurrence of such incidents, it is essential that researchers agree to
disclose such information to subjects when it becomes available.
Although federal regulations 172 and some state statutes 173 re165. See 46 Fed. Reg. 8382, What Should Be the Elements of Informed Consent (Jan.
26, 1981).
166. These elements include: an explanation of the procedures, drugs, or devices to
be used in the experiments; a disclosure of appropriate alternatives; a description of any
possible risks and discomforts which might be expected; an explanation of possible benefits; an offer to answer questions that the prospective subject may have concerning the
experiment and its effect; and an instruction that the individual's consent to participate in
the experiment may be withdrawn at any time without prejudice. See supra notes 66-75,
95 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 3-5, 158-60 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 80, 104 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 105 and accompanying text; see also supra note 113 (a summary
of states requiring IRB approval of research with the mentally ill as subjects).
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quire IRB review of proposed research, most state statutes do
not. 174 In addition to the statutory safeguard of obtaining informed consent from each subject, there should be independent review of the consent process by a disinterested IRB.171 Regulations
alone do not guarantee adherence by researchers and physicians
conducting experiments with human subjects. 176 Review by persons not involved in research can be an effective safeguard against
abuse. 177 State tort law, which requires physicians to obtain the
informed consent of patients before engaging in non-routine therapy, operates only on an ad-hoc basis, after damage has occurred.178 IRB review provides a mechanism by which the consent
process can be monitored before the experiment begins. Such review is especially critical where the subjects are members of a vulnerable group such as minors, the mentally disabled, or the
institutionalized elderly, because decisions concerning the welfare
of such people are often entrusted to third parties who may not
fully consider the risks.
B. Informed Consent Applied to Nontherapeutic and Therapeutic
Experimentation
No person should be the subject of an experiment without his
informed consent.1 79 Voluntary, informed consent protects the
prospective subject's interests by allowing the individual to decide
what risks he is willing to take.' Such protection must extend not
only to nontherapeutic experimentation on healthy subjects, but
also to therapeutic experimentation. It is illogical to protect
healthy subjects in the purely experimental situation while not requiring fully informed consent for persons
who are intended to
8
1
treatment.1
experimental
an
benefit from
See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 24170-24179.5 (West 1984).
175. See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
176. Mulford, supra note 30, at 108.
177. Id.
178. See, e.g., Gaston v. Hunter, 121 Ariz. 33, 62, 588 P.2d 326, 351 (1978).
179. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972). The court
noted that patients must assess benefits and risks in light of their own values, and that
their judgment should control all treatment decisions. Id. at 234, 502 P.2d at 10, 11, 104
Cal. Rptr. at 515.
180. Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 411, 350 P.2d 1093, 1107 (1960); see supra
notes 38-56 and accompanying text.
181. Cf. Capron, supra note 160, at 574-75 (proposing that higher requirements be
imposed for consent to therapeutic experimentation than for consent to nontherapeutic
experimentation because of the tendency of patient-subjects to underestimate risks and
overrate benefits).
174.

HeinOnline -- 17 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 530 1985-1986

1986]

Regulation of Informed Consent

C. The Appropriate Standard of Informed Consent
By requiring informed consent, the law acknowledges that people are autonomous beings.' 82 This acknowledgement may create a
conflict since Anglo-American law traditionally has deferred to the
paternalistic attitude of the medical community. 8 3 This deference
is exemplified by judicial adherence to the "reasonable physician"
standard of informed consent. 1 84 Application of this test allows the
medical profession to be judged by its own standards, and thus
gives researchers and physicians virtually complete license to act in
the interests of medical progress. This approach does not adequately protect the individual subject.
While the "reasonable physician" standard has given way in
some jurisdictions to the less deferential "reasonable patient" standard,'8 5 this change is not sufficient in the context of experimentation with human subjects. The "reasonable patient" standard also
fails to recognize the individual's right of self-determination, since
the court imposes its own view of what a reasonable patient would
want or need to know, instead of determining whether the particular patient was properly informed.'86
Courts should apply the "individual patient" standard' 8 1 in determining whether the subject of a nontherapeutic or therapeutic
experiment received information sufficient to constitute informed
consent. This change in standard is necessitated in part by the increasing risks involved in new lines of experimentation such as genetic research, as well as by the failure of some members of the
medical profession to act ethically in conducting experimentation
with human subjects. 88 Medical professionals were solely responsible for the violations of individuals' rights which occurred in the
Tuskegee incident, 18 9 the Willowbrook project, 190 and the Jewish
Chronic Disease Hospital case.19 ' If physicians and administrators
182. 3 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE
DECISIONS: THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE
PATIENT-PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP 63 (1982).

183. Katz, Informed Consent-A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 137,
139 (1977).
184. See supra notes 135-44 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 150-57 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 17-34 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
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have disregarded the rights of individuals in the past, as exemplified by these experiments, it can unfortunately be assumed that
such violations will continue to occur unless safeguards are provided. The "individual patient" standard of informed consent provides such a safeguard.
V.

CONCLUSION

Research on human subjects is vital to medical and scientific advancement. However, abuses have occurred and will continue to
occur. At present, a large gap exists in regulatory oversight where
research is conducted without federal funds. Most states do not
have statutes that address informed consent to human experimentation. Furthermore, many states that have enacted such legislation merely require that the individual's informed consent be
obtained, without actually defining what type of information must
be provided to a subject. In light of the tremendous risks inherent
in upcoming experiments with genetic manipulation, it is imperative that states provide comprehensive requirements for informed
consent and that regulatory oversight extend to both nontherapeutic and therapeutic research situations.
The elements of informed consent set forth by federal regulations, including IRB review, should be incorporated into every
state statute. It is important that state statutes be substantially
similar to federal regulations so that the researcher or physician is
not forced to contend with a maze of different rules and regulations. Such regulation should not hamper medical research, but
should instead guide researchers and protect them from potential
liability by ensuring that the subject is apprised of the risks.
MARIA WOLTJEN
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